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MISSOURI SECTION
COMMENTS
APPEAL AND ERROR -PARTY AGAINST WHOM JUDGMENT
WAS ENTERED HELD AGGRIEVED BY ORDER GRANTING
NEW TRIAL
Adair County v. Urban, 268 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. 1954)
Plaintiff recovered $4,000 in a breach of contract action, but moved
for a new trial on the ground that the judgment was inadequate. The
trial court overruled plaintiff's motion, but granted a new trial on its
own motion.1 Defendant was satisfied with the original judg-
ment and appealed, contending the new trial was erroneously granted.
Plaintiff challenged defendant's standing to appeal on the ground
that, under the applicable Missouri statute, only parties aggrieved
may appeal.2 The Missouri Supreme Court held that, although judg-
ment against defendant had been set aside by the order granting a
new trial, defendant was aggrieved within the meaning of the
statute. The court reasoned that defendant had a right to terminate
the litigation by accepting the $4,000 judgment against it, thereby
escaping the inconvenience of further litigation and avoiding the
possibility of a greater judgment being entered against it upon re-
trial of the case.2
The general rule is that a party is aggrieved and may appeal from
any judgment4 denying him any part of that which he seeks.5 Under
1. Mo. REv. STAT. § 510.370 (1949) allows trial courts to grant new trials on
their own initiative. The ground assigned in the principal case, dealing with a
supposed error in change of venue, was erroneous; plaintiff's recognition of this
may have caused it to raise what amounted to a novel challenge to defendant's
standing to appeal in order to keep the error from coming before the Missouri
Supreme Court
2. Id. § 512.020 states:
Any party to a suit aggrieved by any judgment of any trial court in
any civil cause from which an appeal is not prohibited by the Constitu-
tion, nor clearly limited in special statutory proceedings, may take his
appeal to a court having appellate jurisdiction from any order granting
a new trial, or order refusing to revoke, modify or change an interlocutory
order appointing a receiver or receivers, or dissolving an injunction, or
from any interlocutory judgments in actions of partition which determine
the rights of the parties, or from any final judgment in the case or from
any special order after final judgment in the cause- but a failure to appeal
from any action or decision of the court before Anal judgment shall not
prejudice the right of the party so failing to have the action of the trial
court reviewed on an appeal taken from the final judgment in the case.
[Italics added.]
3. Adair County v. Urban, 268 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. 1954).
4. The right to appeal is wholly statutory, and while one may generally appeal
from a final judgment, only about half of the states allow appeal from an order
granting a new trial. See Comment, 38 MicH. L. R v. 208, 210 (1939).
5. The rule most often quoted by the courts was originally stated by Sergeant
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this rule, a party may appeal from a partial judgment in his favor,
if by such appeal he seeks to gain a judgment entirely in his favor 0
Appeal is also allowed from a judgment which is apparently in a
party's favor, but actually is illusory in nature.7 A party is not
aggrieved by any judgment truly in his favor, however, and will not
be allowed to appeal when he seeks to divest himself of anything
gained in the course of the litigation.s
The problem raised by the principal case is whether the defendant
was seeking to divest himself of a gain by his appeal from an order
granting a new trial which he did not seek, and setting aside a judg-
ment against him, inasmuch as a new trial would allow the defendant
to reassert his position of non-liability. Although the problem is po-
tentially present in a large number of cases, the only other American
case in which it was raised and decided is Hawkins vi. Nnttallburg
Coal & Coke Co.," a 1909 West Virginia decision. That case held, as
did the principal case, that the defendant was aggrieved by an order
granting plaintiff a new trial, and that by its appeal defendant was
not seeking to divest itself of anything gained in the litigation as it
had gained nothing from a new trial order which it had not sought.
The court said the defendant had the right to have the judgment of
the trial court stand if the defendant so desired, and that it could
appeal from any order infringing upon that right.
There are, however, two distinctions to be drawn between the
principal case and the Hawkins case. First, in the Hawkins case the
trial court granted a new trial upon plaintiff's motion as an exercise
of its discretion;'M in the principal case the order granting a new
trial was based upon a ruling of law by the trial court." Appellate
courts are more hesitant to overrule a decision by a trial court which
involves that court's discretion than they are to overrule a decision
which involves an error of law by the trial court. 2 Thus, the court
Williams, in Williams v. Gwyn, 2 Saund. 46 (1680), to be: "a writ of error can
only be brought by him who would have had the thing if the erroneous judgment
had not been given." See PoUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 123-125(1941).
6. Galloway v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation, 106 F.2d 466 (4th
Cir. 1939) ; Scott v. Parkview Realty & Improvement Co., 241 Mo. 112, 145 S.W.
48 (1912); Lenoir v. South, 32 N.C. 237 (1849). See POUND, op. cit. supra note
5, at 124.
7. Lovett v. Lovett, 93 Fla. 611, 112 So. 768 (1927) ; Teal v. Russell, 3 Ill. 319(1840); Booras v. Logan, 266 Mass. 172, 164 N.E. 921 (1929). See POUND, op. cit.
supro note 5, at 123, 124; 2 TIDD, PRACTICE 1134, 1188 (1856).
8. Humphries v. Shipp, 238 Mo. App. 985, 194 S.W.2d 693 (1946); Western
States Portland Cement Co. v. Bruce, 160 Mo. App. 246, 142 S.W. 783 (1912);
Maxwell Hardware Co. v. Foster, 207 Cal. 167, 277 Pac. 327 (1929).
9. 66 W. Va. 415, 66 S.E. 520 (1909).
10. Id. at 416, 66 S.E. at 520.
11. Adair County v. Urban, 268 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Mo. 1954).
12. See POUND, op. cit. supra note 5, at 217-231 for a discussion of the histori-
cal factors which have led appellate courts to hesitate in overruling any errors
other than those of law.
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in the Hawkins case, while presented with the same logical problem
as to whether defendant was an aggrieved party, nevertheless went
a step further than the principal case in finding the defendant ag-
grieved by a decision involving the discretion of the trial court.
A second distinction between the two cases can be found in the
fact that in the Hawkins case the new trial motion originated in the
plaintiff,'3 while in the principal case the motion originated as an
independent action by the trial court.14 In the principal case, the
court, leaning on a prior Missouri holding not precisely in point, 5
indicated that it felt the fact that the motion for a new trial origi-
nated in the act of the trial court was of importance.10 It would seem
that the difference in how the motion originated is immaterial; the
main factor relied upon by both courts" is that the defendant was
not the moving party in either instance.
From a practical standpoint, the defendant in the principal case
was clearly aggrieved by a decision forcing him from a position
which he felt was favorable and requiring him to defend the same
action again. Although the litigation terminated with an adverse
judgment, the defendant was interested in paying the judgment
rather than being subjected to the possibility of a second and more
detrimental action, and a correct ruling would allow the defendant
to maintain his position. The Missouri court in the principal case has
apparently laid a firm foundation for holding the defendant to be an
aggrieved party, and hence entitled to appeal, whether the order
from which appeal is brought constitutes a ruling of law by the trial
court or amounts to an exercise of that court's discretion, and whether
the order originates in the plaintiff or in the trial court.
13. Hawkins v. Nuttallburg Coal & Coke Co., 66 W. Va. 415, 66 S.E. 520(1909).
14. Adair County v. Urban 268 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Mo. 1954).
15. In Stith v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 363 Mo. 442, 251 S.W.2d 693(1952), the trial court rejected defendant's motion for a new trial in all particu-
lars except as to the issue of damages, and granted a new trial as to damages
alone. The Missouri Supreme Court declared that such new trial had been granted
by the trial court independent of the defendant's motion, and that both defendant
and plaintiff were aggrieved by the order for a new trial. The plaintiff, who had
gained a judgment for the full amount of his action and asked nothing more, was
clearly aggrieved; the defendant, who received only a part of what it desired and
was seeking to gain the rest, a complete new trial, also was aggrieved. The Stith
case is clearly distinguishable from the principal case, therefore, as in the Stith
case both parties were denied something which they actively had sought.
16. Adair County v. Urban, 268 S.W.2d 801, 805 (Mo. 1954).
17. Id. at 804. Hawkins v. Nuttallburg Coal & Coke Co., 66 W. Va. 415, 416, 66
S.E. 520 (1909).
Washington University Open Scholarship
